Dropping the Bombs: How Henry Stimson Influenced the Decision

Dropping the Bombs:

How Henry Stimson Influenced the Decision

In 1945 President Harry S. Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. As with any other administration, he had many top government officials who advised him on domestic and foreign issues. Henry Stimson was Truman’s Secretary of War and after Truman took the presidential office, Stimson had the greatest influence on the crucial decision to use the atomic bomb, more than any other person who Truman trusted to counsel him. There is quite a bit of proof to suggest that Stimson had the most dramatic influence on the President’s foreign policy in terms of both the Soviet Union and Japan all of which were considered when strategizing the atomic bomb’s use.

On April 25, 1945, thirteen days after Franklin Delano Roosevelt died, Harry Truman was first informed of the development of the atomic bomb and how it would affect America’s relations with other countries by Stimson (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 61). Stimson originally encouraged this topic of discussion with the President by saying that it had “such a bearing on our present foreign relations and ... such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field," (Alperovitz, “Historians Reassess”). During this conversation Stimson also told the President, in short, that the atomic bomb would be critical in our dealings with other countries and would be key in shortening the war (Giovannitti, 51; Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 105). Later, Truman said the discussion specifically covered the effect the bomb would most likely have on our interactions with other countries and that “Stimson’s view was a consistent judgment that the atomic bomb would add great power to American diplomacy once it was developed. He considered that no major issue could be realistically discussed with out an estimate of the bomb’s role… (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 105). In Stimson own words two years after the bombs were dropped he described the memorandum with President Truman where he informed the President that in four months a “terrible weapon” that could “destroy a whole city” would probably be ready and the United States was the only country at the time that had the resources to construct said weapon, at least for the time being, but undoubtedly it was not a position to be held indefinitely. He also eluded to the idea that if the weapon was properly used that it could be an opportunity to bring peace (Stimson, 99).

After the President had been briefed on the development of the bomb, Stimson suggested a specific group of people to be charged with the “function of advising the President on the various questions raised about the conduct of the war by the imminent readiness of an atomic weapon and also suggest plans for the longer-term development and control of atomic energy,” (Batchelder, 51; Stimson, 100). After he had gotten the President’s approval, he wasted no time bringing this committee into being (Giovannitti, 53). The group then became known as the Interim Committee and Stimson was its chairman. In Henry Stimson’s 1947 article in Harper’s Magazine, he explained that the committee’s discussions “ranged over the whole field of atomic energy in its political, military, and scientific aspects,” (100).

Before the actual use of the atomic bombs, Stimson believed that the new weapon was “one that should be produced and used as a means of shortening the war and minimizing its destructiveness,” (Batchelder, 67). He had successfully convinced the President and the Interim Committee of the political value of the atomic bomb’s capacity to hasten the end of the war and save American lives (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 165). Stimson believed that the Japanese had been fighting with great tenacity in defense of their empire and would continue to fight fiercely to protect their homeland and millions of American soldiers would be saved by altogether avoiding a mainland invasion by American forces and thereafter informed Truman of this belief (Holmes). Stimson was certain that to bring about Japan’s surrender a colossal blow must be dealt to convincingly prove our power and argued this point to the President (Batchelder, 68). He ensured President Truman that the quickest way to produce the desired affect on Japan was not to attempt it by diplomatic means of persuasion, but rather to increase U.S. military pressure until the Emperor and all of his military advisors realized the bleakness of their fight (Batchelder, 86). The Scientific Panel, which consisted of a number of nuclear physicists involved in the development of the atomic bomb, opposed the use of the bomb, fearing that it would start a nuclear arms race and wanted to turn over the secrets of the bomb over to an international agency to use for more peaceful quests, rather than for war, but Stimson rejected the panel’s suggestions and recommended to the President that to bomb be used on Japan to ensure its surrender (Holmes).

The United States government not only wanted to get Japan to surrender “unconditionally” but to also do so without Soviet Union interference or mediation and they recognized the opportunity the bomb presented to them. Stimson told Truman that he believed that the bomb would fortify America’s position and end the war before the Soviet Union could enter it (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 165). He urged the President that “the thing to do was to get this surrender through before Russia…should get down in reach of the Japanese homeland… It was of great importance to get the homeland into our hands before the Russians could put any substantial claim to occupy and help rule it,” (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 238). By July of 1945 Japan had been significantly weakened by our evermore violent attacks and it had been known that its military leaders had been making offers to the Soviet government, trying to use the Russians to arbitrate a negotiated peace (Stimson, 101). Stimson even regarded the bomb as the “master card” of diplomacy and specifically described it to the President as such:

Let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them
better than anything else.... we have got to regain the lead and perhaps
do it in a pretty rough and realistic way.... we have coming into
action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not ... to indicate
any weakness by talking too much; let our actions speak for themselves. (Alperovitz, “Historians Reassess”).

After the Interim Committee decided that the bomb was definitely going to be used, a strategy to do so still needed to be developed. Stimson influenced President Truman to send a warning to Japan “of what is to come” and said that the warning should precede any actual forceful occupation of the homeland and include plenty of time for a response (Gioannitti, 148). The scientists on the Scientific Panel backed up Stimson’s argument, suggesting a very detailed account of the bomb’s devastating potential be given or that we demonstrate the atomic weapon on an unpopulated area (Holmes). In the end it was Stimson with the sole responsibility of advising the President on matters involving the use of the bomb and he was free to adjust any proposals made by the Interim Committee as he wished (Batchelder, 57).

When it came down to deciding which cities would be most strategic to bomb, Stimson agreed with the President that the best mark for the bombs would be a vital war plant with a large number of employees with workers’ houses bordering it (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 163). Giovannitti and Freed quoted President Truman as having said that he “asked Secretary Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He named Hiroshima and Nagasaki among others…” (249). Stimson convinced the President that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the best targets, stating that Hiroshima was an army center and that Nagasaki, an important seaport, contained major industrial plants (Holmes). Truman was successfully persuaded by Stimson and he exercised his presidential power by giving the go-ahead to the American forces to drop the ruinous weapon on the two major Japanese cities that Stimson recommended.

As Truman’s Secretary of War, Stimson was the most important man in the government with complete information on the highly secret nuclear development project (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy 105) and his influence on President Truman was remarkable and almost without limits due to his proximity to all matters of the bomb. In Alperovitz’s book Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, he even confirms this directly by saying that “Truman often chose to follow Stimson’s advice over most others,” (148). Afterward, Stimson was publicly known as the leading American official identified with the construction and use of the atomic bomb and emphasized his belief by becoming the main spokesperson for the decision (Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb 428). The President himself gave Stimson “great credit” for the atomic bomb’s development (Drummond).

Bibliography

Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.

Alperovitz, Gar. "Hiroshima: Historians Reassess. (Atomic Bombing)." Foreign Policy n99 (Summer 1995 n99): 15(20). Expanded Academic ASAP. Thomson Gale. George Mason University. 4 June 2007.

Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. Colorado: Pluto Press, 1994.

Batchelder, Robert C. The Irreversible Decision. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.

Drummond, Roscoe. “Potsdam Made Bomb Decision.” The Christian Science Monitor 7 Aug. 1945: 1-2.

Giovannitti, Len, and Fred Freed. The Decision to Drop the Bomb. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1965.

Holmes, Thomas. "The Dropping of Atomic Bombs on Japan." Social Eduacation 69.4 (May-June 2005): 209-213. Expanded Academic ASAP. Thomson Gale. George Mason University. 4 June 2007.

Stimson, Henry L. “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.” Harper’s Magazine 194.1161 (February 1947): 97-107. Fenwick Library microfilm. George Mason University. 4 June 2007.